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I. INTRODUCTION
In Montana, as elsewhere, employees are with greater fre-
quency challenging employers' decisions to terminate employment
relationships. The authority of an employer to discharge employees
has come under increasing attack. New theories of recovery for the
discharged employee have further eroded the long-standing but
significantly weakened employment-at-will doctrine. Wrongful dis-




The doctrine of employment-at-will, when employment is of
an unspecified duration, has been of long-standing importance in
American employment relationships. Historically, the doctrine per-
mitted "the employer . . . without liability, [to] discharge the em-
ployee for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all."' Thus,
an employer could terminate at any time the at-will relationship
without incurring liability. The presumption that employment for
an unspecified duration is terminable at-will was recognized as the
"American rule" in 1877.2 This presumption was contrary to the
English common law, where employment was presumed to be for
one year unless otherwise specified.'
At-will theory comported with the doctrine of laissez-faire eco-
nomics popular in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries. The at-will rule was ideally suited to an economy that was
rapidly industrializing during the Lochner era." Even when laissez-
1. Phillips v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 651 F.2d 1051, 1054 (5th Cir. 1981).
2. Boyette, Terminating Employees in Virginia: A Roadmap for the Employer, the
Employee, and Their Counsel, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 747, 757 (1983) (citing H. WOOD, A TREA-
TISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877); Feinman, The Development of the
Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. JUR. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976)); DeGiuseppe, The Recogni-
tion of Public Policy Exceptions to the Employment-at- Will Rule: A Legislative Function?,
11 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 721, 723 n.5 (1983).
3. Id.
4. Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Pol-
icy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1933 (1983). The United States Supreme Court in
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), invalidated a state law that prescribed a maxi-
mum 10 hour work day and 60 hour work week for New York's bakers. During the "Lochner
era," 1897 to 1937, the Supreme Court struck down state and federal economic regulation
pursuant to the due process clause of the United States Constitution. The Court closely
scrutinized the ends sought and the means employed by the challenged legislation. If no real
and substantial relationship between the statute and its objectives could be demonstrated,
the Court would hold that the statute improperly interfered with private economic transac-
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faire economic policy had begun to be repudiated in the mid-
1930's, judicial restraint and reliance on precedent prevented im-
mediate changes in the at-will doctrine.5 The common law rule of
at-will employment thus has been significant in American em-
ployee-employer relationships for more than one hundred years.
B. Statutory Erosion of the Common Law At-Will Rule
The common law rule of employment-at-will has eroded at
both the federal' and state levels. Initially that erosion resulted
from statutory enactments which limited or precluded the em-
ployer's authority to terminate certain employment relationships.
For example, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act
in 1935,7 the Civil Rights Act of 1964,8 and the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967." Additional special statutory enact-
ments protect veterans, 10 civil servants,11 and employees whose
wages have been garnished. 2 Federal legislation protects employ-
ees' rights under federal wage and overtime laws. s Under provi-
sions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1977,14
employers may not discharge employees to prevent them from ob-
taining vested rights to pension and welfare benefits. Federal civil
service employees are statutorily protected from unfair dis-
charges. 15 Other federal legislation includes the so-called "whistle-
blower" statutes designed to encourage employees to report, with-
out threat of discharge, employer violations of environmental or
safety standards.1"
tions. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 434-38 (1978). By the late 1930's, the eco-
nomic realities of the Depression had undermined the freedom of contract and property
principles which supported Lochner reasoning. Positive governmental intervention became
more widely accepted as essential to economic survival. Id. at 446-47.
5. Grove & Garry, Employment-at- Will in Illinois: Implications and Anticipations
for the Practitioner, 31 DE PAUL L. REV. 359, 362 (1982).
6. Id. at 364-66; DeGiuseppe, supra note 2, at 735-38.
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982). Congress provided protection from all types of em-
ployer and union retaliation against employees who engage in "protected concerted activity"
to improve their wages or working conditions or for employees who choose not to engage in
that activity and also created the National Labor Relations Board to hear claims under this
act.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(a) to 2000(a)-6 (1982).
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
10. Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, 38 U.S.C. §
2024(c)(A) (1982).
11. Civil Service Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7543 (1982).
12. Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1982).
13. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 215(a)(3), 216(b) (1982).
14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140, 1141 (1982).
15. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7503, 7513(a) (1982).
16. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 24.1 to .9 (1984); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §
19851
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The Montana Legislature also has created statutory excep-
tions to the at-will doctrine. Title 39, chapter 2, of the Montana
Code Annotated contains several provisions which protect employ-
ees, for example: the prohibition against discharge or layoff be-
cause of attachment or garnishment of wages 7 and the prohibition
against blacklisting an employee.'" Nurses and other health care
employees have the right not to participate in sterilization and
abortion procedures without jeopardizing their job security. 9 Pro-
tection against discrimination in employment, both public and pri-
vate, similarly is provided by statute20 and by the Montana
Constitution.2
Each of these state and federal statutes has limited the em-
ployer's authority to terminate "without liability" the employment
relationship "for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all. '' 2"
Each of these statutes has eroded an employer's authority to dis-
charge an employee.
III. JUDICIAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE AT-WILL RULE
Some, but not all, state courts have recognized or created ex-
ceptions to the at-will rule. 23 Those which have, generally recognize
three judicial exceptions: (1) when the discharge constitutes a vio-
lation of public policy; (2) when the discharge breaches an implied
or express promise of job security; and (3) when there exists an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.24
A. Violation of Public Policy
Even when employment is otherwise terminable at-will, if dis-
charging an employee violates public policy, the termination is
held to be either a breach of contract or a tort.2 For example, in a
2622 (1982); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (1982); Safe Drinking
Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i) (1982); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851
(1982); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6971 (1982); Air Pollution Prevention and
Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (1982); Railroad Safety Act, 45 U.S.C. § 431(a) (1982).
17. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-302 (1983).
18. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-803 (1983).
19. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-5-503, 50-20-111; Swanson v. St. John's Lutheran Hosp.,
182 Mont. 414, 417, 597 P.2d 702, 704 (1979).
20. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-1-101 to 49-4-102 (1983).
21. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
22. Phillips, 651 F.2d at 1054.
23. See C. BAKALY & J. GROSSMAN, MODERN LAW OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS § 9
(1983). The present state of the at-will rule in all states is described. Id. at app. A.
24. See id. at § 9.1.
25. Id. The public policy exception may be viewed not so much as erosion of the at-
will rule, but as application of developing principles of contract law. Id.
[Vol. 46
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landmark case recognizing a public policy exception to the employ-
ment-at-will rule, the California Court of Appeals held that an em-
ployee had been wrongfully discharged for refusing to commit per-
jury.26 Public policy exception cases generally fit into three
categories: discharge as retaliation for refusing to commit an illegal
act, discharge as retaliation for exercising vested statutory rights,
and discharge for "whistle-blowing."27
B. Promise of Job Security
When there has been an express28 or implied29 promise of job
security, courts have recognized an exception to the at-will rule.
These cases arise when the parties have not agreed to the duration
of the contract nor to limit their right to terminate the employ-
ment relationship, and there is an allegation of an express or im-
plied promise of continued employment.
C. Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The principle of contract law that each party to the contract
implicitly promises the other to act in good faith now has been
applied to the employment setting, but in the tort context.30 Not
surprisingly, the recognition of tort actions for bad faith in em-
ployment relationships parallels the recent development of bad
faith actions in insurance,31 banking, 2 and other commercial rela-
tionships. Unlike bad faith actions in the latter categories, how-
ever, in which courts base liability upon violations of insurance and
commercial transactions statutes, the courts use no such statutory
underpinning to extend the tort to the employment relationship.
D. The Montana Perspective
While court decisions from outside Montana are helpful in un-
26. Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184,
188, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (1959).
27. BAKALY & GROSSMAN, supra note 23, § 9.1 at 117. This article also provides a dis-
cussion of non-Montana cases. Id. at § 9.1.
28. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981)
(employee was promised job security so long as he did "a good job" and was loyal); Fox v.
Fifth W., Inc., 153 Mont. 95, 454 P.2d 612 (1969) (suit on an express oral contract for one
year of employment as construction manager).
29. BAKALY & GROSSMAN, supra note 23, § 9.2; Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, 57 N.Y.2d 458,
443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982).
30. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977);
Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982).
31. Klaudt v. Flink, - Mont. - , 658 P.2d 1065 (1983).
32. First Nat'l Bank in Libby v. Twombly, - Mont. - , 689 P.2d 1226 (1984).
19851
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derstanding the development of this area of employee relations
law, the law in Montana is unique in several aspects. Exercising
caution when relying on non-Montana cases in this quickly devel-
oping area, the practitioner should review the Montana law care-
fully, being cognizant of differences between Montana's treatment
of the subject and the treatment given by other jurisdictions.
IV. MONTANA CASES: THE ATTACK ON THE AT-WILL RULE
In the past seven years several decisions from the Montana
Supreme Court and the Montana Federal District Court have af-
fected employee rights under Montana law. Decisions responding
to challenges to the employment-at-will doctrine, which exists by
virtue of statute, 33 have changed employment relations law in
Montana. This article chronologically collects and annotates the
significant decisions.
The first Montana case to refer to the tort of bad faith in
breach of an employment contract was Sovey v. Chouteau County
District Hospital.3" The plaintiff Sovey claimed bad faith when the
defendants allegedly wrongfully discharged him as hospital admin-
istrator. The district court dismissed Sovey's initial and amended
complaints on procedural grounds 3' and the Montana Supreme
Court affirmed, without any comment on Sovey's substantive
claims.5 6
In Keneally v. Orgain,37 the Montana Supreme Court consid-
ered as a question of first impression wrongful discharge arising
from a public policy violation. The plaintiff-employee Keneally al-
leged he was wrongfully discharged when he challenged the quality
of service and equipment maintenance provided to defendant Na-
tional Cash Register Company's (NCR) customers in Keneally's
district. Although it held that Keneally was not wrongfully dis-
charged, the court indicated a willingness to recognize the tort in
proper circumstances. In dictum, the court stated: "We do not dis-
agree at this juncture that in a proper case a cause for wrongful
discharge could be made out by an employee. The District Court
here could not discern that any public policy had been violated by
Keneally's termination and neither can we. Accordingly, we must
33. Notwithstanding the holding in Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hospital, -
Mont. -, 693 P.2d 487 (1984), that the employment-at-will statute is very much alive,
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-503 (1983) no longer codifies the historical at-will doctrine.
34. 173 Mont. 392, 567 P.2d 941 (1977).
35. Id. at 392-93, 567 P.2d at 942.
36. Id. at 395, 567 P.2d at 943.
37. 186 Mont. 1, 606 P.2d 127 (1980).
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concur."38 Although it recognized the possibility of a wrongful dis-
charge claim based upon a "violation of public policy," the court
on these facts rejected this "whistle-blower theory" as a means to
establish the claim.
We can find no public policy violated by the discharge of
Keneally unless it may be considered that the public is hurt when
a corporation allows sales of its machines to be made upon
promises of adequate service and maintenance and then fails with
respect to the adequate service or maintenance. Keneally had
complained on this point to his supervisors, and he contends that
this is one of the principal grounds for his discharge. 9
The Montana Supreme Court, in Reiter v. Yellowstone
County,40 specifically applied the at-will statute as controlling. The
plaintiff Reiter had been employed by Yellowstone County for
nearly eighteen years when he was discharged. No written contract
governed his employment. Reiter sought to overcome the at-will
statute4 1 on a theory of implied contract that included an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As stated by the court, "In
effect his argument [was] that due to his longevity of service he
had an implied contract of employment, that in the implied con-
tract there was an implied covenant of good faith, and that his
discharge was in bad faith."'4 2
Soundly rejecting Reiter's implied contract argument, the
court stated:
Appellant's argument on implied contracts cannot success-
fully circumvent the Montana statute which clearly denies his
claim of entitlement to continued employment. Even though ap-
pellant may have had an implied contract with the county by vir-
tue of his longevity of service, it would be a contradiction in
terms to say that he had an "implied specified" period of employ-
ment. A specified term is one which the parties expressed, and
there was no expression here concerning the length of the em-
ployment. Section 39-2-503, MCA, operates to fill the gap left by
the parties by defining the relationship as an "at-will" employ-
ment. While the rule may well be outdated, it is uniquely a prov-
ince of the legislature to change it.43
The court, moreover, rejected (albeit temporarily) the implied cov-
38. Id. at 6-7, 606 P.2d at 130.
39. Id. at 6, 606 P.2d at 129-30.
40. - Mont. -, 627 P.2d 845 (1981).
41. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-503 (1983).




Hopkins and Robinson: Wrongful Discharge
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1985
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
enant of good faith when the employment is at-will: "Further, as-
suming arguendo that appellant had an implied contract with an
implied covenant of good faith, the employer did not act in bad
faith because its conduct [discharge] was statutorily permissible.
Reiter was not employed on a 'discharge for cause only' basis, ac-
cording to the [at-will] statute. ' 44 Thus, the Montana court in Rei-
ter affirmed the statutory at-will doctrine, denied that an oral or
implied contract could contain the necessary "implied specified
term," and seemingly foreclosed any recognition of an implied cov-
enant of good faith in an at-will employment relationship because,
based on the statute, any termination was permissible. 5
In Staudohar v. Anaconda Co.,46 United States District Judge
Russell Smith granted summary judgment on behalf of the com-
pany by whom Staudohar contended he was wrongfully discharged
in violation of public policy. Staudohar, who was discharged be-
cause he was found to be in unauthorized possession of company
property, argued that his approximately thirty-five years of contin-
uous employment with the company created an entitlement to em-
ployment that his discharge violated. Judge Smith held that the
employment was terminable at-will and that Staudohar's firing was
not violative of any public policy because such considerations are
"simply not involved" when a discharge is based on unauthorized
possession of an employer's property.
47
Six months after the Reiter decision, the Montana Supreme
Court established a limited exception to the at-will doctrine based
on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in Gates v.
Life of Montana Insurance Co. (Gates I)." Gates, working pursu-
ant to "an oral contract of indefinite duration,"' 9 was given the
option of resigning or being fired. The parties disputed whether
Gates had resigned or had been fired. The court ordered a new
trial to determine by what method she had been terminated and
whether her termination had violated an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.
Gates heavily predicated her theories upon an employee hand-
book which had been distributed two years after she was hired.
44. Id. at -, 627 P.2d at 849-50.
45. While more recent cases make Reiter suspect, the case still might be relied upon to
defeat an employee's claim of entitlement to a piocedural due process hearing arising from a
property interest in the at-will employment. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
46. 527 F. Supp. 876 (D. Mont. 1981).
47. Id. at 878 (citing Reiter, - Mont. -, 627 P.2d 845; Keneally, 186 Mont. 1,
606 P.2d 127).
48. 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Gates I].
49. Id. at 180, 638 P.2d at 1064.
[Vol. 46
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The handbook provided that "prior warning"5 should be given if
an employee was to be dismissed because of inadequate perform-
ance. The court held that "[an employee handbook distributed af-
ter the employee is hired does not become a part of that em-
ployee's contract,"51 and thus found no contractual basis for Gates'
claims. The court also rejected an argument that Gates had stated
a claim for wrongful discharge in tort, because she had not demon-
strated that her termination was in violation of any public policy,
the requirement set out in Keneally.
The Gates I court then outlined an obligation of good faith in
employment contracts:
Recent decisions in other jurisdictions lend support to the pro-
position that a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied
in employment contracts. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.
(1977), 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251; Monge v. Beebe Rubber
Co. (1974), 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549. These cases emphasize
the necessity of balancing the interests of the employer in con-
trolling his work force with the interests of the employee in job
security. In adopting the doctrine of good faith in employment
contracts the courts did not seek to infringe upon the interests of
the employer, but recognized that:
" ...[a]n employer is entitled to be motivated by and to
serve its own legitimate business interests; that an employer
must have wide latitude in deciding whom it will employ in
the face of the uncertainties of the business world; and that
an employer needs flexibility in the face of changing circum-
stances." Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., supra, 364
N.E.2d at 1256.
Yet the employee is entitled to some protection from injustice.2
The bad faith claim arose from the employer's failure to follow its
own employee handbook which, although not a contract, "presum-
ably" was promulgated "to secure an orderly, cooperative and loyal
work force by establishing uniform policies . . .. If the employer
has failed to follow its own policies, the peace of mind of its em-
ployees is shattered and an injustice is done." 53 On this basis, the
court held:
that a covenant of good faith and fair dealing was implied in the
employment contract of the appellant. There remains a genuine
issue of material fact which precludes a summary judgment, i.e.
50. Id. at 183, 638 P.2d at 1066.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 184, 638 P.2d at 1066-67.
53. Id. at 184, 638 P.2d at 1067.
1985]
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whether the [employer] failed to afford appellant the process re-
quired and if so, whether the [employer] thereby breached the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.54
The significance of Gates I is the court's holding that in em-
ployment contracts there is an implied "covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, '"" even though the employee is working at-will. The
court thus implicitly abandoned its dictum in Reiter,5" that had
suggested that termination of an at-will employee could not be in
bad faith because the termination was statutorily authorized. It
should be noted that the court did not hold that failure to follow
the handbook processes was, ipso facto, a violation of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. The court said "[a]nd if so" then
there must be a determination as to whether the failure was "in
good faith. 57
Shortly after Gates I, the Montana Supreme Court in Nye v.
Department of Livestock5" specifically established the tort of
wrongful discharge when the discharge is in violation of public pol-
icy. Nye was hired by the Department of Livestock originally as a
permit clerk. She was later promoted to general office clerk V and
was to be on probationary status in her new position for six
months. During her probationary period, department supervisors
warned Nye of deficiencies in her work which had to be corrected
for Nye to continue in her position. Upon her failure to correct, the
Department discharged Nye without fully complying with depart-
ment rules governing termination of employment. When Nye filed
suit in district court claiming wrongful discharge, the Department
argued that her employment was at-will and therefore not subject
to a wrongful discharge claim. Holding that "the tort of wrongful
discharge may apply to an at will employment situation," e the
court ruled that administrative rules of a state agency could be the
54. Id. at 184-85, 638 P.2d at 1067 (emphasis added).
55. Id.
56. The court distinguished Reiter, - Mont. -, 627 P.2d 845, as follows:
The doctrine of implied covenant of good faith in employment contracts has been
neither adopted nor rejected by this Court, although it was discussed in Reiter v.
Yellowstone County, supra. Reiter is distinguishable in that the issue there was
whether an employee at will had a property interest in continued employment and
was entitled to procedural due process prior to termination. In Reiter we did not
reach or decide the issue presented here.
Gates I, 196 Mont. at 183, 638 P.2d at 1066. See also Leland v. Heywood, 197 Mont. 491,
643 P.2d 578 (1982) (a college could terminate, without violating public policy, a nontenured
teacher without formal hearing).
57. Gates 1, 196 Mont. at 185, 638 P.2d at 1067.
58. 196 Mont. 222, 639 P.2d 498 (1982).
59. Id. at 228. 639 P.2d at 502.
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source of a public policy supporting such a claim of wrongful
discharge."0
In August, 1983, the Montana Supreme Court again reviewed
the Gates case in Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Co. (Gates
H),6" and affirmed the award of $50,000.00 in punitive damages
granted by the jury upon remand and trial. Based on her previous
appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, Gates was allowed to es-
tablish that the employer's failure to follow handbook disciplinary
procedure had violated the implied "covenant of good faith and
fair dealing."62 Holding that the "[bireach of the duty owed to deal
fairly and in good faith in the employment relationship is a tort for
which punitive damages can be recovered if defendant's conduct is
sufficiently culpable,"6 the court thus established an independent
tort of bad faith in at-will employment relationships existing
"apart from, and in addition to, any terms agreed to by the
parties." 4
The Montana Supreme Court recently expanded the parame-
ters of this new tort in Dare v. Montana Petroleum Marketing
Co.6 5 Relying on Gates I, Dare alleged breach of an implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing when she was fired after not
completing a work shift due to illness. The trial court held that
absent a handbook setting out employment policies and proce-
dures, the plaintiffs claim must fail. The supreme court, however,
held that a plaintiff need not prove a handbook violation to estab-
lish a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. Rather, "[i]mplication of the covenant de-
pends upon existence of objective manifestations by the employer
giving rise to the employee's reasonable belief that he or she has
job security and will be treated fairly."66 Noting that "the implied
covenant protects the investment of the employee who in good
60. Id. The Nye decision has been subsequently cited by the Montana Supreme Court
as a case involving wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Dare v. Montana Petro-
leum Mktg Co., Mont. - , 687 P.2d 1015, 1018-19 (1984). It is difficult to understand
how failure to follow agency procedural employment rules constitutes a violation of public
policy, unless the violation arises because the rules were promulgated by a state agency.
Swanson, 182 Mont. 414, 597 P.2d 702, is a better example of a public policy violation case.
In Swanson, the hospital employee was discharged for refusal to assist in a sterilization
procedure. Such a refusal is protected by the "conscience statutes" for health care employ-
ees. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-5-502, -503 (1983).
61. - Mont. -, 668 P.2d 213 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Gates III.
62. Gates 1, 196 Mont. at 184-85, 638 P.2d at 1067.
63. Gates II, - Mont. at - , 668 P.2d at 215.
64. Id. at -, 668 P.2d at 214.
65. - Mont. -, 687 P.2d 1015 (1984).
66. Id. at - , 687 P.2d at 1020.
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faith accepts and maintains employment reasonably believing their
job is secure so long as they perform their duties satisfactorily," 7
the court held that the district court had erred in dismissing tort
claims for emotional, mental, and financial distress."
On December 6, 1984, in Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess
Hospital,69 the Montana Supreme Court extended the duty of good
faith and fair dealing established in Gates I to "probationary em-
ployment relationships. '70 Shirley Crenshaw had provided respira-
tory therapy services to Bozeman Deaconess Hospital as indepen-
dently contracted services. In December, 1981, the hospital
purchased the respiratory therapy department and Crenshaw be-
came a hospital employee on probationary status in conformance
with usual hospital procedure. A personnel policy manual provided
that a probationary employee could be discharged at any time
without notice during the 500-hour probationary period. Under
disputed circumstances, the hospital discharged Crenshaw during
her probationary period. The discharge memorandum included
charges of insubordination and breach of patient confidentiality.
Crenshaw's subsequent efforts to obtain employment through the
Bozeman Job Service were unsuccessful. As a result, Crenshaw
filed suit against the hospital, alleging wrongful discharge and
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Applying the Dare standard of "objective manifestations . . .
giving rise to [plaintiff's] belief that she had job security" 71 to the
facts, the court found that Crenshaw had reason to believe her job
was secure and that as an employee she was entitled to good faith
and fair dealing by the employer. As in Gates I, the court again
distinguished its earlier decision in Reiter on the basis that Reiter
was a "property interest" case, not a good faith and fair dealing
case.7 ' The court similarly distinguished between "wrongful dis-
charge" claims which arise only when there has been a violation of
public policy 73 and claims of violation of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.7 4
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. - Mont. -, 693 P.2d 487 (1984).
70. Id. at -, 693 P.2d at 491.
71. Id.
72. Id. at -, 693 P.2d at 492; see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39, 65-68.'
74. Crenshaw, __ Mont. at -, 693 P.2d at 493. The court explained further that
when it "adopted the concept of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing" from
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974), it did not agree to adopt
the subsequent limitation to situations when the termination violated public policy found in
Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273 (1980).
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In response to the defendant's allegation that the at-will stat-
ute75 conflicts with the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the
court held "that the 'at-will' statute . . . is very much alive. '7 The
court explained that the "requirement of good faith and fair deal-
ing . . . merely supplements [the at-will statute]. '  Thus,
"[e]mployers can still terminate untenured employees at-will and
without notice. They simply may not do so in bad faith or unfairly
without becoming liable for damages. '78
In addition to affirming the viability of the at-will statute, the
court made new law on a number of important issues. Holding that
the trial court's issuance of a jury instruction defining negligence
was not in error, the court agreed with Crenshaw's contention that
negligence based on a defendant's failure to make a proper investi-
gation of the allegations resulting in discharge was a "theory sepa-
rate and distinct from the theory of breach of good faith and fair
dealing. '7 1 Further, noting that negligence was a separate basis of
the plaintiff's cause of action, the court relied on a Montana stat-
ute80 and stated that "it is necessary to prove more than ordinary
negligence" 81 to recover punitive damages. The court, however,
found that the evidence of the defendant's malicious acts set forth
by the plaintiff in this case justified the submission of the issue of
punitive damages to the jury.82
Crenshaw underscores the significant alteration over the past
seven years of Montana statutory law concerning the discharges of
75. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-503 (1983).
76. Crenshaw, Mont. at __ , 693 P.2d at 492 (emphasis added).
77. Id.
78. Id. The defendant hospital acted in bad faith when it notified the local Job Service
of the plaintiff's unsatisfactory work performance thereby depriving her of local employ-
ment, and when it made false charges and allegations in the discharge memorandum
thereby jeopardizing her career.
79. Id. at - , 693 P.2d at 493.
80. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1983).
81. Crenshaw, __ Mont. at - , 693 P.2d at 495.
82. Id. at - , 693 P.2d at 496.
83. Constructive discharge can occur when an employee has resigned. See Young v.
Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975), in which the court defined
"constructive discharge" as follows:
The general rule is that if the employer deliberately makes an employee's working
conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resigna-
tion, then the employer has encompassed a constructive discharge and is as liable
for any illegal conduct involved therein as if it had formally discharged the ag-
grieved employee. (Citations omitted).
Id. at 144.
The definition of "constructive discharge" propounded in Young was quoted with ap-
proval by the Montana Supreme Court in Snell v. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 198 Mont.
56, 65, 643 P.2d 841, 846 (1982). The Montana court in Snell rephrased the test to be
whether "the employer has rendered working conditions so oppressive that resignation is the
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employees working at-will. At the present time, an employee may
sue in tort for wrongful discharge if he can demonstrate that the
discharge was in violation of public policy. The leading cases in
this regard are Keneally, Staudohar, and Nye. The Montana Su-
preme Court also has established an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in employment contracts, even when there is no
express or written contract and the employee is working under an
oral contract of indefinite duration. The significant cases in this
regard are Reiter, Gates I, Gates II, Dare, and Crenshaw. The
court in Crenshaw apparently now has recognized negligence as an
additional cause of action in an employment termination case.
Illustrating the need for close attention to this area of law is
the court's statement in Crenshaw that because Gates I had been
decided two months prior to Crenshaw's discharge, 4 the employer
was "on notice to deal in good faith at the time [of the dis-
charge]."8s In light of this statement, however, it is significant that
the employer in Gates I was liable even without such notice.
V. DAMAGES
"[T]hose who suffer legally recognized injuries are entitled to
damages."8 6 In Montana, in the termination of at-will employment
relationships, legally recognized injuries may result from at least
the torts of wrongful discharge, breach of covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, and negligence. These tortious acts by an em-
ployer may give rise to claims for compensatory or punitive
damages.
Compensatory damage claims may include, for example, past
87inwages, future earnings, medical insurance coverage, pension and
profit benefits, stock options, and raises. Claims for emotional dis-
tress and loss of self-esteem or reputation also may arise. Montana
case law is still scant with regard to the viability of some of these
claims.88
only reasonable alternative." Id. at 65, 643 P.2d at 846.
84. Gates I was issued January 5, 1982, and Crenshaw was discharged on March 12,
1982.
85. Crenshaw, __ Mont. at -, 693 P.2d at 495.
86. H. PERRIrr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.27 (1984) (citing D. DOBBS,
LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.1 (1973)).
87. BAKALY & GROSSMAN, supra note 23, § 10.5.2. Such claims may be offset by actual
earnings or reasonably expected earnings. The extent to which lost future earnings ("front
pay") may be awarded has not been adjudicated in Montana. Cf. Panhandle E. Pipe Line
Co. v. Smith, 637 P.2d 1020, 1025 (Wyo. 1981) (upholding district court determination that
wrongfully discharged employee who had 26 years work life expectancy could be awarded
eight years' front pay).
88. In dictum in Dare, Justice Morrison in a concurring opinion indicated the view
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The Montana Supreme Court, however, has held that punitive
damages clearly are recoverable when a breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing has been proven."" Presumably, the
wrongful discharge tort, based on a violation of public policy, also
can give rise to recovery of punitive damages."
VI. ROLE OF THE JUDGE AND JURY
A. Public Policy Torts
In a wrongful discharge case alleging violation of public policy,
the plaintiff initially must identify the public policy which gives
rise to the tort action. "[T]he threshold question is what public
policy would be jeopardized if the plaintiff's dismissal were allowed
to go uncompensated."'I When clear statutory or constitutional
language is violated, identification of public policy is relatively un-
complicated. More difficult to identify are the policies embodied
in, for example, professional codes of ethics or popular notions of
public good.2
Once the plaintiff has identified the public policy, the question
arises whether the judge or the jury should determine public policy
requirements.9 3 At least one author has suggested that "it is the
court's job to decide what the applicable public policy is, . . ." rea-
soning that it is better for judges to make value judgments that are
subject to appellate review, than for juries to make value judg-
ments which are unpredictable and immune from appellate re-
view.94 Within this scheme, the jury decides as a matter of fact the
employer's reasons for discharging an employee; the judge, as part
that reinstatement is not a remedy in a wrongful termination case. - Mont. at , 687
P.2d at 1022 (Morrison, J., concurring).
89. Crenshaw, - Mont. at - , 693 P.2d at 495; Gates II, - Mont. at -, 668
P.2d at 215.
90. The standard of proof for presumed malice with regard to a punitive damage claim
in an employment termination context is:
When a person knows or has reason to know of facts which create a high
degree of risk of harm to the substantial interests of another, and either deliber-
ately proceeds to act in conscious disregard of or indifference to that risk, or reck-
lessly proceeds in unreasonable disregard of or indifference to that risk, his con-
duct meets the standard of willful, wanton, and/or reckless to which the law of
this State will allow imposition of punitive damages on the basis of presumed
malice.
Owens v. Parker Drilling Co., - Mont. - , 676 P.2d 162, 164 (1984).
91. PERRITT supra note 86, § 7.9.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at §§ 7.8, 7.9.
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of his balancing responsibility, determines if the employer had le-
gal justification for the discharge."6 In fact, Comment k to section
870 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS requires the judge to
balance the employer's interests against those of the employee and
of the public to determine whether tort liability exists for em-
ployee dismissal in the circumstances alleged by the plaintiff, and
to decide what employer justifications apply."6 Thus, the jury is
limited to factual questions within a public policy framework that
the judge has determined and embodied in the jury instructions. 7
In cases where the court has decided as a matter of law that
certain activity comes within the ambit of protected public policy,
the jury's role, not unlike that of the jury in an employment dis-
crimination suit, would be to determine whether the termination
was for the prohibited public policy reason or for another legiti-
mate reason. To put it differently, was the reason given for termi-
nation a pretext for the public policy reason? In that type of case,
the trial court is required to give instructions on the shifting bur-
dens of proofs8 and the "but for" 9 issues.
B. Breach of the Employment Agreement or Violation of the
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
An employee may allege that his dismissal was motivated by a
reason that violates the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, as in Gates I,100 Dare,'0' or Crenshaw.'0 2 Or, the employee
may allege that the express or implied in fact contract of employ-
ment permits dismissal only for certain reasons ("just cause") and
the employer dismissed him for some other reason.'03 In either
case, the employer's motive is essential in determining liability.'0
In Gates I, the court held that there was a genuine issue of
material fact, i.e., whether the employer had breached the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing, which precluded summary
judgment.'05 It is clear that the jury may infer a breach of the cov-
95. Id. at § 7.8.
96. Id.
97. Id. See id. at § 7.14 for sample jury instructions.
98. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Martinez v. Yellow-
stone County Welfare Dep't, - Mont. - , 626 P.2d 242 (1981).
99. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977);
Swanson, 182 Mont. 414, 597 P.2d 702.
100. 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063.
101. - Mont. -, 687 P.2d 1015.
102. __ Mont. , 693 P.2d 487.
103. PERRITT, supra note 86, § 7.18.
104. Id.
105. Gates I, 196 Mont. at 184, 638 P.2d at 1067.
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enant of good faith and fair dealing 0 6 and that the plaintiff has
the burden of proving that the employer acted in bad faith.107 The
jury should be instructed regarding that burden and its right to
draw inferences from the facts. 0 8 The Montana Supreme Court
held in Crenshaw that expert testimony is appropriate to assist
"the jury to understand the evidence and ultimately the breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing question at is-
sue."'1 9 The court stated that when a complex labor issue is in-
volved and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing allegedly
has been breached, "[f]ault. . . is not easily comprehensible to the
average person." 1 0 This ruling apparently confirms that it is the
jury who will decide if the covenant has been breached."'
In breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing cases, the
role of the trier of fact varies. For example, if the employer's deci-
sion to discharge was predicated upon underlying facts which are
disputed (e.g., determining who was the aggressor in a physical al-
tercation between two employees), the jury's role is to decide
whether the investigation was fair and had been done in good
faith."' If the jury concludes that the investigation was fair and
done in good faith, the jury then should not be allowed to reexam-
ine the employer's decision to determine whether, under similar
circumstances, the jury also would have chosen to discharge the
employee. In cases in which the underlying reason for termination
is not in basic dispute, however, the jury's role is to determine
whether the employer's procedural handling of the discharge was
in compliance with either written personnel policies," 3 unwritten
personnel policies,"" or policies which an expert witness has testi-
fied were unfair and a deviation from good personnel practice."'
After making this determination, the jury then must decide
whether the violation of policies or good personnel practices was
106. PERRITT, supra note 86, § 7.18.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Crenshaw, __ Mont. at - , 693 P.2d at 495.
110. Id. at , 693 P.2d at 494.
111. Presumably, if the employer has articulated applicable discharge procedures "em-
bodying the rudiments of procedural fairness, e.g., notice, an unbiased decision maker, and
an opportunity for the employee to tell his or her side of the story," the jury will decide only
if those rules were followed and will not look to the fairness per se of those procedures.
PERRITr, supra note 86, § 9.2 at 330. Cf. Reiter, - Mont. -, 627 P.2d 845 (at-will
employee does not have right to due process hearing).
112. See, e.g., Crenshaw, - Mont. -, 693 P.2d 495.
113. Gates 1, 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063.
114. Dare, - Mont. -, 687 P.2d 1015.
115. Crenshaw, __ Mont. -, 693 P.2d 494.
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done in bad faith or was motivated by some other illegal reason.
The jury's role in cases in which the employee has established
the right to be discharged only "for cause" is still unclear. If the
jury is allowed to decide whether there was "good cause" or "just
cause" for the dismissal, i.e., whether it too would have discharged
the employee in a case in which the employer had relied upon what
it reasonably believed to be a legally proper and sufficiently factual
basis to exercise its at-will rights, the jury simply would be substi-
tuting its decision for the employer's.1 6 The better procedure" 7 is
for the jury not to review the accuracy of the employer's factual
determination, but to decide only whether the employer reasonably
believed in good faith that the decision to discharge was legally
proper and was predicated upon accurate factual information." 8
C. The Montana Perspective
The Montana Supreme Court has not directly addressed the
problems relating to the role of the court and the jury in employ-
ment termination cases. When the court does, its decision will be
significant in determining the parameters of employment termina-
tion actions. As Justice Morrison stated in his concurrence in Dare,
"I ...do not envy the trial court the task of developing instruc-
tions from what we have said."" 9
VII. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
Since the actions of wrongful discharge and breach of the cov-
enant of good faith and fair dealing are relatively new in Montana
and elsewhere, little law has been developed on the specific issue of
the applicable statutes of limitations. There is no Montana case in
which the Montana Supreme Court has recognized a wrongful em-
ployment termination cause of action that was predicated upon a
contract theory. Given the Montana court's emphasis in Gates I
116. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880
(1980), for this view. The Toussaint decision effectively requires shifting the burden of
proof to the employer. PERRITT, supra note 86, § 7.20.
117. BAKALY & GROSSMAN, supra note 23, § 10.1.1 at 148; PERRIrr, supra note 86, §
7.20.
118. See Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96, 643 P.2d 1276 (1982) (when
reviewing a private employer's decision to discharge for cause, the court only need find that
the employer acted on the basis of its determination that facts constituting just cause actu-
ally existed). See also Thomas v. Bourdette, 45 Or. App. 195, 608 P.2d 178 (1980) (court
refused to invade province of employer's decision to discharge managerial employee who
willfully disobeyed order not to purchase certain equipment, even though the equipment
purchase appeared to have increased profits).
119. Dare, - Mont. at __, 687 P.2d at 1022 (Morrison, J., concurring).
[Vol. 46
18
Montana Law Review, Vol. 46 [1985], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol46/iss1/1
1985] WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
and 11, Dare, and Crenshaw that these are tort actions, tort stat-
utes of limitations apparently apply. Montana statutes provide
that tort actions for general and personal injury must be filed
within three years120 of the date of the commission of the tort.12'
There is no Montana case, however, in which the court has dis-
cussed this application of the tort statute of limitations. Case law
from other jurisdictions is likewise sparse.
Recently, however, in a diversity case involving the applicable
statute of limitations in a wrongful discharge action, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the federal court must apply
the state's substantive law on the issue. If the state court has not
ruled on the issue, then the federal court "must fashion the rule we
believe that court would follow were it confronted with a similar
situation."' 22 The circuit court relied upon federal labor laws for
the development of California law, noting that the California
courts had turned to federal law as a guide to the development of
state employment law.' 2 3 In Montana the same is true. 24 Thus, be-
cause the factual circumstances of federal labor and employment
discrimination cases, as they pertain to statute of limitations is-
120. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-204 (1983).
121. Any action for restoration to office by a person wrongfully removed, or any suit
for recovery of salary by any person wrongfully removed or excluded from office, must be
filed within six months from the date of the wrongful removal or exclusion. MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-2-212 (1983). It is not clear whether this statute applies only to public employees
or to both public and private employees.
122. Daniels v. Fesco Div. of Cities Serv. Co., 733 F.2d 622, 623 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing
Roesgen v. American Home Prod. Corp., 719 F.2d 319, 321 (9th Cir. 1983)). See also Mes-
senger v. Volkswagen of Am., 585 F. Supp. 565 (D. W. Va. 1984) (federal district court
looked to state law and held that the two year tort statute of limitations in West Virginia
applied to wrongful termination suit); Scott v. Union Tank Car Co., - Ind. App. -,
402 N.E.2d 992 (1980) (wrongful termination suit arising out of a discharge allegedly in
retaliation for filing a workman's compensation claim, in specific violation of Indiana stat-
ute, was governed by the tort statute of limitations); Stanley v. Sewell Coal Co., 285 S.E.2d
679 (W. Va. 1981) (wrongful termination suit based upon alleged contravention of public
policy sounds in tort; it is not an action arising out of contract).
123. The plaintiff Daniels alleged that although he was notified of his termination
from employment on October 24, 1980, he was not actually terminated from salary pay-
ments until November 30, 1980. He brought his action on November 29, 1982, one day
before the statute of limitations expired, if the statute of limitations commenced running on
the date of his last salary payment. The Ninth Circuit not only found that the applicable
statute of limitations was two years, it further held that the statute begins to run upon
notification of the termination "even though the employee continues to serve the employer
after receipt of such notice." Daniels, 733 F.2d at 623. Accordingly, Daniels' suit was dis-
missed because it was filed one month and six days too late.
124. See, e.g., Teamsters, Local 45 v. State ex rel. Bd. of Personnel Appeals, 195
Mont. 272, 635 P.2d 1310 (1981); State v. District Court, 183 Mont. 223, 598 P.2d 1117
(1979); Local 2390 of Am. Fed'n of State, County, Mun. Employees v. City of Billings, 171
Mont. 20, 555 P.2d 507 (1976); State Dep't of Highways v. Public Employees Craft Council,
165 Mont. 349, 529 P.2d 785 (1974).
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sues, are similar to those factual circumstances in cases of wrongful
discharge or breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, federal laws and decisions '25 are relevant to the develop-
ment of Montana statute of limitations case law.
VIII. DEFENSES: PREEMPTION, EXCLUSIVITY, AND EXHAUSTION
Federal statutory remedies may preclude resort to common
law judicial remedies under the preemption doctrine. 126 Also, if an
administrative agency has been authorized by statute to address
the factual circumstances, the administrative agency proceeding
may be at least the prerequisite, if not the exclusive, remedy.
A. Preemption by Collective Bargaining Agreements Under
the National Labor Relations Act
When a collective bargaining agreement provides for arbitra-
tion of grievances as the exclusive and final dispute resolution pro-
cedure, the employee generally may not circumvent the collective
bargaining agreement by bringing a tort action.1 7 This precludes a
state court from adjudicating labor contract grievances in the guise
of tort claims. There has been, however, rapidly developing case
law which either questions the validity of the preemption doctrine
as a defense to wrongful termination tort claims, or creates excep-
tions to the doctrine. The courts are not in agreement as to the
circumstances which excuse a plaintiff from using and exhausting
the dispute resolution procedures of a collective bargaining agree-
ment.2 8 Confronted with a wrongful termination case involving an
125. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. (Wittenberg), 116 L.R.R.M. 1417, 1419
(1984). The National Labor Relations Board held that the six-month time limitation to file
an unfair labor practice charge against the employer begins to run on "the date of the al-
leged unlawful act," which is the date the adverse employment decision is communicated to
the employee. In the context of employment discrimination cases, see Evans v. United Air
Lines, 534 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd 431 U.S. 553 (1977). See also Milton v. Wein-
berger, 696 F.2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Terry v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 519 F.2d 806 (7th Cir.
1975); Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1975); Griffin v. Pacific
Maritime Ass'n, 478 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 859 (1973).
126. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
127. The National Labor Relations Act may preempt "state common law action for
wrongful discharge if the plaintiff employee is covered by the federal statutes and if the
employer conduct at issue in the state action bears a close relation to collective bargaining."
(Footnotes omitted.) PERRirr, supra note 86, § 2.26. Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper
Co., 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984); Buscemi v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 736 F.2d 1348 (9th
Cir. 1984). See also Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 275 Ala. 685, 158 So. 2d 492 (1963),
rev'd, 379 U.S. 650 (1965) (when provided, arbitration is the exclusive remedy for breach of
a collective bargaining agreement).
128. The Ninth Circuit has held that a state wrongful discharge action by an employee
who is subject to a collective bargaining agreement can avoid federal preemption only when
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employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the practi-
tioner must analyze carefully the recent cases on the subject.
B. Montana: Exclusivity and Exhaustion
The Montana Human Rights Commission is at least the ini-
tial, if not the exclusive, Montana forum in which a party alleging
employment discrimination pursuant to the Human Rights Act 12 9
or the Governmental Code of Fair Practices ' ° must seek a remedy.
In Walker v. Anaconda Co., 3' an action predating the "right to
sue" procedure, the federal court dismissed the complaint filed
against the employer because the plaintiff's exclusive remedy was,
at that time, before the Human Rights Commission.
In 1983, the Montana Legislature enacted two statutes which
permit claims under the Human Rights Act and Code of Fair Prac-
tices to be filed in district court. Either party may request the
right to file the action in district court. Before issuance of a "right
to sue letter," however, at least the following criteria must be met:
(1) the complaint must have been filed with the Commission
for more than 180 days;
(2) efforts of the commission staff to settle the informal inves-
tigation must have failed;
(3) the Commission must determine that a contested case
hearing cannot be held in the case within twelve months of the
filing of the complaint; and
(4) if a right to sue letter is issued at the request of either
party, the charging party must bring an action in district court
within ninety days of receipt of the right to sue letter or the claim
will be barred. '32
A claim for discrimination in employment must first be filed
before the Human Rights Commission before resorting to the judi-
the discharge violates public policy. Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.
1984), U.S. appeal pending (discharge of truck driver for making complaints to a state
agency about spoilage of food products he delivered; separate action for wrongful termina-
tion allowed even though discharged employee had unsuccessfully arbitrated his discharge
under the collective bargaining agreement). Several courts recently have expressed concern
that the right to bring suits for wrongful discharge should not be denied to employees who
are employed under collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago,
Inc., 2 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (117 L.R.R.M.) 2807 (Ill. Oct. 19, 1984); Alpha Beta Inc. v.
Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1049, 207 Cal. Rptr. 117 (1984); Lueck v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 116 Wis. 2d 559, 342 N.W.2d 699 (1984), U.S. appeal pending.
129. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2-101 to -601 (1983).
130. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-3-101 to -312 (1983).
131. 520 F. Supp. 1143 (D. Mont. 1981), aff'd, 698 F.2d 1228, afJ'd, 698 F.2d 1230,
aff'd, 698 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1982).
132. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2-509, 49-3-312 (1983).
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cial forum. A district court complaint asserting a violation of pub-
lic policy or violation of the covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing, however, may be filed simultaneously with the claim before
the Human Rights Commission, or the wrongful discharge and bad
faith claims may be combined with the discrimination claim in dis-
trict court after the Commission issues the right to sue letter. The
Montana Supreme Court has not ruled on the relationship between
employment tort claims and employment discrimination claims.
Thus, it still is unclear whether an aggrieved employee can bypass
the administrative procedure by enveloping a discrimination claim
within a wrongful discharge or bad faith action in a judicial pro-
ceeding. If the gravamen of the wrongful discharge action is predi-
cated upon discriminatory conduct prohibited by the Montana
Human Rights Act, the complaint may be vulnerable to the de-
fense that the administrative remedy has not been properly used
or exhausted.13 3
IX. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PRACTITIONER
As the law presently exists in Montana, the plaintiff who prop-
erly pleads a complaint with conclusory allegations can readily ar-
gue that a jury issue has been created in nearly every discharge
situation. Since arbitration of disputes pursuant to an arbitration
clause in an employment agreement is prohibited under present
Montana law, at least as to at-will employees,'3 it remains to be
seen how either the Montana Legislature or the courts will develop
limitations, both substantive and procedural, to claims of wrongful
termination.
Involuntary termination of employment, by its nature, fre-
quently (perhaps always) evokes the discharged employee's reac-
133. See L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 121.10 & n.4 (1984) stating:
Plaintiffs who have asserted that their termination violated both traditional
discrimination law and an explicit exception to employment at will have, for the
most part, been unsuccessful. Most courts that have considered the question have
held that the presence of a statutory remedy precludes a common law wrongful
discharge action when the discharge complained of was based on a statutory cate-
gory such as age, sex, or race.
(Footnote omitted). See also State ex rel. Jones v. Giles, 168 Mont. 130, 541 P.2d 355 (1975)
(reiterating that administrative remedies must be exhausted in the Departments of Revenue
and of Highways respectively); State ex rel. Sletten Constr. Co. v. City of Great Falls, 163
Mont. 307, 516 P.2d 1149 (1973).
134. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-5-101 to -304 (1983). See Palmer Steel Structures v. Wes-
tech, Inc., 178 Mont. 347, 584 P.2d 152 (1978); Smith v. Zepp, 173 Mont. 358, 567 P.2d 923
(1977); Green v. Wolff, 140 Mont. 413, 372 P.2d 427 (1962) (contract provisions which pro-
vide that all future disputes shall be submitted to arbitration are void because they restrict
access to the courts).
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tion that the employer made the wrong decision. Virtually every
allegation of bad faith or negligence will be viewed as creating a
genuine issue of material fact which precludes dismissal at the
summary judgment stage of litigation. In the absence of any clear
judicial definition of what constitutes a violation of the covenant of
"good faith and fair dealing" in the employment relationship, even
managerial decisions made in good faith may not avoid full blown
judicial scrutiny. Notwithstanding the court's reassurances ex-
pressed in Dare and Crenshaw that the at-will statute remains via-
ble, it appears that the ability of a discharged employee to contest
his discharge judicially creates, as a practical matter, an exception
that has swallowed the statutory rule. In contrast to the pre-1980's
environment where a discharged employee was effectively without
recourse unless he was employed under a collective bargaining
agreement, today's at-will employee who takes issue with his em-
ployer's decision to terminate the employment relationship has ac-
cess to traditional judicial remedies in the Montana courts.
X. CONCLUSION
"Unless [the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
is] limited in its scope, . . . or utilized only when it is consistent
with promises actually made by the employer, as in Gates,"'35 the
use of the theory will be extraordinarily far-reaching. It "could
have the effect of imposing on all private employers an obligation
to dismiss only where a jury can be satisfied that cause existed."' 3
Until there is further amplification or clarification by the Legisla-
ture or the courts on this subject, an employer in Montana may be
subject to liability whenever a jury disagrees with the employer's
exercise of a management decision affecting the employment
relationship.
Although the Montana Supreme Court has stated that it has
not affected the employer's statutory at-will right, it at the very
least has imposed on employers a wariness of juries who may not
agree with the decisions required in the myriad employment dis-
putes which can result in employment termination. The employee
who has been discharged for reasons that violate public policy, in
breach of an express or implied agreement of job tenure, or when
the employer has acted outrageously, has been given judicial reme-
dies that were overdue. It remains to be seen whether further
evolution of the law will devise some protections against a jury




Hopkins and Robinson: Wrongful Discharge
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1985
24 MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
"second guessing" an employer's decision to terminate employ-
ment in circumstances in which the decision, albeit made for legiti-
mate reasons, is open to "managerial debate" by expert witnesses.
For that employer, extensive litigation, culminating in a jury's as-
sessment by a presently undefined standard of "good faith and fair
dealing," is a likely prospect whenever the employee decides to
challenge an employment termination.
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